Whether the information environment affects the cost of capital is a fundamental question in accounting and finance research. In this paper, we study the role of competition among informed investors on the pricing of information asymmetry and its implications for the pricing of information quality. Relying on theories on competition among informed investors and on the pricing of information asymmetry, we hypothesize and find that the pricing of information asymmetry and the pricing information quality decrease with more competition among informed investors. Our results suggest that competition among informed investors has an important effect on how the information environment affects the cost of capital.
I. Introduction
Whether information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital is an important issue in the theoretical (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O'Hara 2004; Hughes et al. 2007 ) and empirical literature (e.g., Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1996; Easley et al. 2002; Duarte and Young 2009; Mohanram and Rajgopal 2009) . In this paper, we study the role of competition among informed investors on the pricing of information asymmetry. Our key finding is that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases when there is more competition among informed investors. This finding is important because it suggests that in the presence of information asymmetry, more competition among informed investors can lower the cost of capital. Further, as we describe below, it has implications for a large literature that investigates the pricing of information quality (e.g., Botosan 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Francis et al. 2004 Francis et al. , 2005 .
The intuition for our hypothesis that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases in competition among informed investors is briefly described as follows (we describe related theories and formally develop our hypothesis in Section 2). Theories on investor competition
show that more competition among informed investors results in private information being incorporated into prices more rapidly, i.e., more competition makes prices more efficient (Foster and Viswanathan 1993, 1996; Subrahmanyam 1992, 1994) . We argue that competition among informed investors can then affect the pricing of information asymmetry due to two reasons: (i) it could reduce trading costs arising from price protection by market makers against information asymmetry (Kyle 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991) , and (ii) it could reduce the information risk uninformed investors bear when trading against informed investors (Easley and O'Hara 2004) .
To measure competition among informed investors, we follow prior literature and consider institutional investors as informed investors (Arbel and Strebel 1983; Sias and Starks 1997; Bartov et al. 2000; Jiambalvo et al. 2002) . Using data on total institutional investor ownership for each firm, we construct measures of competition based on (i) the number of total institutional investors, (ii) the percentage of outstanding shares held by total institutional investors, and (iii) a Herfindahl index of competition that captures both the level and the distribution of total institutional ownership. Further, recognizing that transient institutional investors (compared to quasi-indexers and dedicated institutional investors) are the ones most likely to trade on information (Bushee 1998; Ke and Petroni 2004; Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005) , we also construct analogous measures using data on transient institutional investor ownership.
To measure information asymmetry, we use the information asymmetry component of bid-ask spreads and the probability of informed trading (PIN) based on decomposition models developed by Glosten and Harris (1988) and Duarte and Young (2009) , respectively. We include the non-information asymmetry components of spreads and PIN as control variables in our empirical analyses to increase the confidence that our findings are driven by information asymmetry. In untabulated analyses, we find that our inferences are unchanged if we use total spreads and PIN.
To examine the role of competition among informed investors in the pricing of information asymmetry, we use standard asset pricing regressions. We find significant evidence that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases in the extent of competition among informed investors. For instance, the difference in the pricing of the information asymmetry component of spread between the most competitive quintile of firms and the least competitive quintile ranges from 0.70% to 1.23% per month, depending on the competition measure used.
The results with the information asymmetry component of PIN are in the same direction, although the economic significance is smaller. Specifically, the differential pricing of information asymmetry across competition among informed investors ranges from 0.22% to 0.25% per month.
In further analyses, we find that the evidence for the differential pricing of information asymmetry conditional on competition is the strongest for competition among transient investors and the weakest (and often insignificant) for competition among dedicated investors. This evidence is consistent with our conjecture that competition among investors who trade actively on information (compared to competition among investors who do not trade actively on information) is likely to have a greater effect in mitigating the pricing of information asymmetry.
To address concerns that our measures of competition might be capturing broader aspects of the trading environment that are not related to information asymmetry, we also run tests that control for the cross-sectional variation in the broader trading environment. The results from these tests indicate that the differential pricing of information asymmetry conditional on competition is robust to controlling for share turnover, trading volume, and return volatility.
Finally, we examine whether investor competition influences the pricing of information quality. This literature argues that information quality is priced because poor information quality is associated with higher information asymmetry and information asymmetry is priced (e.g., Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004 Francis et al. , 2005 . To measure information quality, we use accruals quality and earnings smoothness because these measures have been recently used to examine the pricing of information quality (Francis et al., 2004 (Francis et al., , 2005 Core et al. 2008; McInnis 2009 ). We also use annual report readability (FOG) developed by Li (2008) as another measure of information quality. We find consistent evidence that the pricing of information quality decreases when there is more competition among informed investors. This result adds support to the argument that one reason that information quality is priced is because of information asymmetry This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it draws upon the theoretical literature to make predictions about the effect of competition among informed investors on the pricing of information asymmetry. We show that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases with competition among informed investors, and that the effect is economically important. While the idea of competition among informed investors has been discussed in the theoretical literature, to the best of our knowledge, no prior empirical paper has investigated the outcomes of such competition.
Second, we extend the prior literature that has empirically investigated the pricing of information asymmetry and information quality. Recent studies provide mixed evidence on whether information asymmetry/quality is priced (e.g., Easley et al. 2002; Francis et al. 2005; Core et al. 2008; Duarte and Young 2009; Mohanram and Rajgopal 2009) . We show that the extent of the competition among informed investors has an important role in determining whether information asymmetry is priced. Stated differently, information asymmetry/quality is more likely to be priced in trading environments with less competition among informed investors. Finally, our consistent findings with proxies for information asymmetry and information quality reinforce the idea that information asymmetry is one mechanism linking information quality to the cost of capital. By doing so we address one claim in Leuz and Wysocki (2008, p. 30) that "At present, however, the literature has primarily focused on establishing the link between disclosure and the cost of capital and has provided relatively little evidence on the mechanism." Our paper is related to a concurrent working paper by Armstrong et al. (2009) . While both papers study the effect of competition on the pricing of information asymmetry, there are some important differences. At the conceptual level, Armstrong et al. study the role of competition among all investors. In contrast, as our paper relies on theories on competition among informed investors, we study the role of competition among informed investors in mitigating the pricing of information asymmetry. Consequently, these papers also differ at the empirical level by using a non-overlapping set of proxies for competition. Another unique feature of our paper is that we compare the relation between the pricing of information asymmetry and competition among different types of informed investors. An interesting result is that more competition among investors who actively trade base on information has a greater effect in mitigating the pricing of information asymmetry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops our hypothesis.
Section III describes our research design. Sections IV and V present our results on the pricing of information asymmetry and information quality, respectively. Section VI concludes.
II. Hypothesis development
In this section we develop our hypothesis of the role of competition among privately informed investors on cost of capital. A seminal theoretical result obtained by Kyle (1985) is that private information is incorporated into price over time due to the informed trades in the case of an information monopolist. Several theory papers extend Kyle by introducing more than one informed investor so that there is competition among informed investors. A key finding is that that competition among informed investors typically results in private information being incorporated into prices more rapidly and, thereby, increases price informativeness. This finding has been proven in the case of multiple risk-neutral homogeneously informed traders (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992; Foster and Viswanathan 1993) , of riskaverse homogeneously informed traders (Holden and Subrahmanyam 1994) , of heterogeneously informed traders (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Foster and Viswanathan 1996) , among others. We build on this literature to hypothesize that the pricing of information asymmetry will decrease with competition among informed investors.
To set the stage for linking competition with the pricing of information asymmetry, first consider a Kyle (1985) model in which there are a single asset, a single risk neutral privately informed trader, competitive market makers, and noise traders trading for liquidity reasons. The asset would be priced in a manner that imposes trading costs, implying an effect on expected return, i.e., the cost of capital. In this type of model, the revelation of information into the public domain affects the cost of capital through a reduction in information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991) . Most importantly, an increase in the number of informed traders results in competition among those traders that would reduce trading costs and thus lower the cost of capital (Admati and Pfleiderer 1988) . Thus, the implication from this theory is that the information asymmetry component of trading costs would decrease with competition among informed investors.
Next, consider a competitive market composed of privately informed investors, uninformed investors, and a finite number of assets as in Easley and O'Hara (2004) . In this model, informed investors use their information advantage to trade with uninformed investors and hold portfolios more heavily weighted to stocks with positive private information and weighted against stocks with negative private information. The information asymmetry increases the risk to the uninformed investors, who cannot adjust their portfolios to account for private information. In equilibrium, information asymmetry is priced to reflect the risk to the uninformed investors. Once again, to the extent that more competition among informed investors helps to make prices more informative and mitigate the information disadvantage of the uninformed investors Subrahmanyam 1992, 1993; Foster and Viswanathan 1993, 1996) , the pricing of information asymmetry is expected to decrease with more competition.
In light of the above theories, our conjecture is that, ceteris paribus, more competition among informed investors reduces the impact of information asymmetries on the cost of capital due to (potentially) two reasons: (i) it could reduce trading costs arising from price protection by market makers due to information asymmetry (Kyle 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991) , and (ii) it could reduce the information risk uninformed investors bear when trading against informed investors (Easley and O'Hara 2004).
Hence, our hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is:
The pricing of information asymmetry decreases in competition among informed investors.
III. Research Design
To test our hypothesis, we use cross-sectional asset pricing regressions similar to those employed in prior research to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on the crosssection of returns (e.g., Easley et al. 2002; Duarte and Young 2009) . In particular, the typical cross-sectional regression specification used to test for the pricing of information asymmetry is as follows:
where R t+1 is monthly excess return during the 12-month period in year t+1 (in the event of a delisting, a firm's delisting return, when available from CRSP, is used as the monthly return),
Control is a set of control variables that are expected to be associated with expected returns and Information Asymmetry is a proxy for information asymmetry.
To examine whether the pricing of information asymmetry is conditional on the extent of competition among informed investors, we modify Eq. (1) as follows:
where Competition is a proxy for competition among informed investors. To reduce the effect of outliers and to ease exposition, we rank Competition into quintiles using the distribution of its value within the year and then scale the quintile rank so that it ranges from zero to one.
In the above regression, λ 2 indicates the pricing of information asymmetry of firms in the least competitive quintile and λ 3 indicates the incremental pricing of information asymmetry as one moves from the bottom to the top quintile of competition. Based on our hypothesis that the pricing of information asymmetry is decreasing in the competition among informed investors, we expect λ 3 to be negative. To mitigate cross-sectional dependence in the regression residuals, we follow the prior literature and estimate Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions (e.g., Fama and French 1992; Easley et al. 2002) . Specifically, we first run cross-sectional regressions for each month in the sample. Each reported coefficient is the average of the monthly coefficients. The tstatistic for each reported coefficient is obtained by dividing the coefficient by the standard error of the monthly coefficients.
Measures of competition among informed investors
In order to test our hypothesis, we need a measure of informed competition. While the prior theoretical literature has examined issues related to informed competition, we are unaware of prior attempts in the empirical literature to measure informed competition. Before we describe our measures, we note that our measures rely on the common assumption in the literature that institutional investors, as opposed to individual retail investors, are more likely to be the class of informed investors (e.g., Arbel and Strebel 1983; Sias and Starks 1997; Bartov et al. 2000; Jiambalvo et al. 2002) . For example, Sias and Starks (1997) provide evidence that the returns on portfolios dominated by institutional investors lead the returns on portfolios dominated by individual investors, consistent with the hypothesis that institutional trading increases the speed with which prices reflect market-wide information.
Our first measure of informed competition is the number of institutional investors holding the firm's stock (#Inst). This measure is motivated by the theories that examine the effect of competition among informed investors (e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer 1988; Holden and Subrahmanyam 1992; Foster and Viswanathan 1993) . These theories use the number of informed investors to represent the extent of the informed competition, where a greater number of informed investors indicates more informed competition. The second measure of informed competition is the proportion of institutional stock ownership, i.e., percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors (%Inst). More informed competition might be expected when there is a higher percentage of institutional investor ownership in a stock because a higher percentage of institutional investor ownership indicates a higher level of sophistication in the investor base (Bartov et al. 2000; Jiambalvo et al. 2002) .
The use of the number of informed investors (as opposed to the fraction of investors) in theory models is for mathematical tractability. A similar prediction, however, can be developed with the fraction of informed investors. For instance, Edmans and Manso (2009) show that the percentage of informed ownership is negatively associated Our third measure of competition among informed investors captures both the level and the distribution of total institutional ownership into a Herfindahl index. This index has been used to measure competition in a variety of settings such as product market competition within the industry (e.g., Comment and Jarrell 1995; Gande et al. 1999 ). In the context of competition in the trading environment of a stock, we propose a measure of the amount of competition in stock i, HerfInst, as follows:
where Investor i,j is the number of shares held by institutional investor j in stock i, Investors i is the total shares held by all institutional investors of stock i, and N is the total number of institutional investors in stock i. Following the standard interpretation of the Herfindahl index, highly concentrated holdings indicates less competition in the trading environment. Thus, to ease exposition, we multiply the Herfindahl index by minus one so that a higher value of HerfInst signifies that there is more competition in the trades of stock i among institutional investors. By construction, HerfInst could range from -1 to 0, with a number closer to 0 indicating more competition. When there are no institutional investors for a firm, we assume that there is no competition among informed investors and assign a value of -1 to the Herfindahl index.
As discussed above, we use institutional investors as a proxy for informed competition.
Prior research, however, has shown that certain types of institutional investors are more likely to trade on information (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Ke and Ramalingegowda, 2005) . For example, a commonly used institutional investor classification is the division of institutional investors into transient investors, dedicated investors, and quasiwith the Kyle's lambda if one allows the percentage holdings to be correlated with the precision of the information impounded in prices when informed investors trade.
indexers that was developed by Bushee (1998) . Ke and Petroni (2004) and Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) find that transient institutional investors (i.e., institutional investors who hold small stakes in numerous firms and trade frequently in and out of stocks) trade on information to make profitable trades. Ke and Petroni (2004) find that transient institutional investors have information that allows them to predict a break in a string of consecutive quarterly earnings increases and thereby avoid the economically significant negative stock price response associated with the break announcement. Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) We construct the above measures of informed competition by using the institutional investor database provided the author of Bushee (1998) , who, in turn, creates his variables using data on shares held by institutional investors from the CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f)
Holdings ( 
Measures of information asymmetry
The extensive empirical literature has used various measures of information asymmetry, with the bid-ask spread and probability of informed trading (PIN) being the more common measures (e.g., Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Lee et al. 1993; Easley et al. 2002) . One issue with these measures is that they also capture other components, specifically order processing and inventory holding costs for spread and liquidity for PIN, in addition to information asymmetry. We thus follow prior literature and use the information asymmetry component of spread and PIN to better capture our construct of interest -information asymmetry (e.g., Glosten and Harris 1988; Duarte and Young 2009 ).
We measure the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms for the period from 1983 to 2004 using the model of price formation developed in Glosten and Harris (1988) . The empirical implementation of this model is often used in the literature to estimate the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread (e.g., Subrahmanyam 1995, 1996; Verrecchia and Weber 2008) .
Specifically, the bid-ask spread is decomposed into an information asymmetry component , and a non-information asymmetry component, the probability of symmetric order flow shocks (PSOS). They motivate this decomposition by noting that the sequential trade model on which PIN is based attributes abnormal trading to private information, but this trading could also result from liquidity shocks.
To address this concern, Duarte and Young (2009) observations. We then regress these returns on lagged and contemporaneous market returns to correct for potential bias resulting from non-synchronous trading. Firms are then sorted by these pre-ranking betas into 40 portfolios at the beginning of each year and rolling five-year Dimson betas are calculated for each portfolio. Each firm is assigned the beta from its portfolio for that year. Size is the natural log of the market value of equity measured at the end of the calendar year. To measure book-to-market, BTM, we obtain the book value of equity for the fiscal year ending at least three months prior to the calendar end (this ensures that book value is publicly available at the end of the calendar year). We then divide the book value of equity by the market value of equity at the end of the calendar year and take the natural logarithm of this ratio.
IV. Pricing of information asymmetry
Sample description [Insert Table 1 here]
Summary statistics and the correlations for the variables used in our study are provided in Table 2 . Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. [Insert Table 2 here]
Cross-sectional asset pricing tests
The next two tables present the regression results of the cross-sectional asset pricing tests of information asymmetry. Table 3 (Table 4) uses IASpread (AdjPIN) as the measure of information asymmetry. For comparability across different measures, when we make inferences about the economic significance from the coefficients of interest, we assume a one standard deviation difference in the information asymmetry (standard deviations are obtained from Table   2 ) and examine how this difference translates into expected returns.
In the first column of In the remaining columns, we examine whether the pricing of information asymmetry decreases in the extent of competition among informed investors. As noted earlier, the coefficient of interest is λ 3 , the coefficient on the interaction term between IASpread and a proxy for competition among informed investors. This coefficient is statistically significant in all the columns, although only marginally so when using HerfInst as a competition proxy. Specifically, the coefficients range from -0.52 to -0.91, depending on the measure of competition. This indicates that the expected return for a one standard deviation difference in information asymmetry in the most competitive quintile ranges from -0.70% (1.35 x -0.52) to -1.23% (1.35 x -0.91) per month less than that in the least competitive quintile. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases in the extent of the competition among informed investors.
We note that the pricing of the non-information-asymmetry component of spread,
NIASpread, also decreases when there is more competition among informed investors.
Conceptually, this component captures the fixed costs per share, specifically inventory holding cost and order processing cost per share, of market-making. A possible explanation for lower fixed costs per share is that the trading activities of institutional investors, which is presumably higher when there is more competition among them, helps to lower spread the fixed costs over more traded shares and thus, lowers fixed costs per share.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In Table 4 , we repeat the analyses with AdjPIN as the measure of information asymmetry.
In the first column, the results indicate that AdjPIN is not priced whereas the non-information In terms of economic significance, the -2.73 coefficient on the interaction term between
AdjPIN and %Inst indicates a monthly differential in the required rate of return of 0.25% per month (2.95% per year) between stocks in the least and most competitive quintiles for a one standard deviation difference in information asymmetry. The -2.39 coefficient on the interaction term between AdjPIN and %Trans indicates a monthly differential in the required rate of return of 0.22% per month (2.58% per year) between stocks in the least and most competitive quintiles for a one standard deviation difference in information asymmetry.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Overall, the results from the cross-sectional asset pricing results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with our hypothesis that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases with competition among informed investors.
Analysis across Different Types of Institutional Investors
As dedicated (quasi-indexing) institutional holdings multiplied by -1 so that it is increasing in market competition. Just like before, the measures are ranked into quintiles using the distribution of its value within the year and then scale the quintile rank so that it ranges from zero to one. Overall, the results in Table 5 support our conjecture that the nature of the competition among investors is important in the effect of competition on the pricing of information asymmetry. Specifically, competition among investors who are more likely to actively make information-based trades has a greater effect in mitigating the pricing of information asymmetry.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Controlling for the Broader Trading Environment
As noted earlier, our use of institutional ownership characteristics to develop measures of informed competition is guided by prior theoretical and empirical literature. However, there is the concern that our results could be simply capturing cross-sectional variation in the broader trading environment that is unrelated to competition among informed investors in the trading environment. The challenge with controlling for the trading environment is that some of the aspects of the trading environment are likely to be outcomes of the competition among informed investors. For example, higher stock turnover might result from more competition, and including these trading characteristics as control variables might not be "over-control" for the effect of competition. Nevertheless, we examine if our results are robust to attempts to control for the cross-sectional variation in the general trading environment.
To control for cross-sectional variation in the broader trading environment, we use share turnover (Turnover). The literature has considered share turnover to be a measure of stock liquidity (Datar et al. 1998) , disagreement among investors (D'Avolio 2002), and investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler 2006) . Specifically, in all our regressions we include share turnover and its interactions with measures of information asymmetry and non-information asymmetry. In untabulated analyses we find that our results are robust to the use of alternative proxies for the broader trading environment such as total trading volume and idiosyncratic volatility. Table 6 shows our results after including Turnover and its interactions with measures of information asymmetry and non-information asymmetry as additional control variables into Equation (2). For the sake of brevity, we report only the coefficients on the measures of information asymmetry, share turnover, competition, as well as the interaction terms between share turnover and information asymmetry and between competition and information asymmetry. Panel A, which repeats the analyses in Table 3 with the additional control variables, uses IASpread to measure information asymmetry. The inclusion of Turnover does not significantly affect our earlier results. Specifically, the pricing of IASpread decreases in the cross-section with more competition among informed investors, after controlling for the crosssectional variation in share turnover. Interestingly, the pricing of information asymmetry does not vary cross-sectionally with share turnover. This suggests that competition among informed investors, and not the broader trading environment, drives the cross-sectional variation in the pricing of information asymmetry.
The results in Panel B, which uses AdjPIN as the measure for information asymmetry,
show that our earlier results in Table 4 are robust to controlling for the cross-sectional variation in the broader trading environment using share turnover. Similar to the results in Table 4 , we find that when competition among informed investors is measured using %Inst and %Trans, the pricing of AdjPIN decreases in the cross-section with more competition. In fact, the statistical significance of the interaction terms between %Inst and AdjPIN and between %Trans and
AdjPIN are now at a 1% level, whereas they are significant at a 5% level in Table 4 . Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction term between AdjPIN and competition is now marginally significant at a 10% level when HerfInst is used to measure competition. Similar to Panel A, we find that the pricing of information asymmetry does not vary cross-sectionally with share turnover.
[Insert Table 6 here]
V. Informed competition, information asymmetry, and information quality
Our hypothesis predicts that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases with competition among informed investors. We test this hypothesis using the information asymmetry component of spread and PIN. Our goal is to provide evidence with empirical proxies that best approximate the economic construct information asymmetry.
In this section, however, we examine the implications of our earlier results for a fundamental issue in the accounting literature that has attracted extensive theoretical and empirical research: the pricing of information quality. The general prediction in this literature is that cost of capital is higher when information quality is poorer (e.g., Botosan 1997; Francis et al. 2004 Francis et al. , 2005 . To the extent that poorer information quality captures higher information asymmetry, as argued in this literature, the pricing of information quality could also decrease with more informed competition if the pricing of information asymmetry decreases with more informed competition. Hence, in this section, we investigate whether the pricing of information quality decreases with competition, under the assumption that information quality proxies for information asymmetry.
To proxy for information quality (IQ), we use accruals quality (AQ) and earnings smoothness (Smoothness). These measures have been recently used in the literature with mixed findings on their association with the cost of capital (Francis et al., 2004 (Francis et al., , 2005 Core et al. 2008; McInnis 2009 ). In addition, we also use a measure of annual report readability (FOG) developed by Li (2008) as another proxy for information quality. The intuition behind this measure is that, everything else equal, more syllables per word or more words per sentence make a document harder to read.
We follow Francis et al. (2005) To the extent that poorer information quality proxies for higher information asymmetry, the results support our hypothesis that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases in competition among informed investors. From the first three columns, we observe that the coefficient on the interaction term between AQ and #Trans (%Trans, HerfTrans) is -13.87 (-7.56, -13.59 ). This indicates that for a one standard deviation (which equals 0.03) difference in AQ, the monthly difference in the expected return in the most competitive quintile is 0.42% (0.23%, 0.41%) less than in the least competitive quintile. 3 In the next three columns, the coefficient on the interaction term between Smoothness and #Trans (%Trans, HerfTrans) is -0.34 (-0.28, -0.45 ).
This indicates that for a one standard deviation (which equals 0.52) difference in Smoothness, the monthly difference in the expected return in the most competitive quintile is 0.18% (0.15%, 0.23%) less than in the least competitive quintile. Finally, in the last three columns, the coefficient on the interaction term between FOG and #Trans (%Trans, HerfTrans) is -0.17 (-0.21, -0.16 ). This indicates that for a one standard deviation (which equals 1.41) difference in FOG, the monthly difference in the expected return in the most competitive quintile is 0.24% (0.30%, 0.23%) less than in the least competitive quintile. Overall, the results in Table 7 are present support for the joint hypothesis that the pricing of information quality decreases with competition and that information quality proxies for information asymmetry.
[Insert Table 7 here]
VI. Conclusion
The issue of whether information asymmetry is priced has been of significant academic interest. In this paper, we re-examine this question by emphasizing an important aspect of capital markets with information asymmetry -competition among informed investors. While prior empirical literature has investigated whether information asymmetry is priced on average, it has not studied whether there is cross-sectional variation in the pricing conditional on the extent of the competition among informed investors. Relying on theories that highlight that more competition among informed investors leads to more informative prices, our study examines the variation in the pricing of information asymmetry conditional on the extent of competition among informed investors.
In our study, we use the information asymmetry components of bid-ask spread and PIN as proxies for information asymmetry. To measure the degree of competition among informed investors, we use a variety of proxies based on institutional investor ownership, with the underlying assumption that institutional investors are more likely to be the informed investors.
While the theories on competition among informed investors typically depict competition in terms of the number of informed investors, we also develop alternative proxies that take into account the size of the ownership by informed investors and the distribution of shares among them.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we show that the pricing of information asymmetry decreases with competition among informed investors, and that the effect is economically important. We then explore its implications on the accounting literature that examines whether information quality, as a proxy for information asymmetry, is priced. We repeat our analyses by replacing our measures of information asymmetry proxies with measures of information quality, and we find similar results. That is, our results indicate that the pricing of information quality also decreases in competition among informed investors.
Our results suggest that future research investigating the effects of the information environment should consider the level of competition among informed investors in the trading environment. A direct implication of our findings is that in face of information asymmetry, firms could potentially reduce their cost of capital by encouraging more competition among informed investors through higher institutional ownership and/or more even distribution of shares among institutional investors. An indirect implication of our findings is that efforts to mitigate information asymmetry such as increased corporate disclosure and transparent financial reporting might have greater cost of capital effects in markets (either within a single country or across different countries) characterized by less competition among informed investors.
Appendix A. Decomposition of spread
The following regression specification to obtain the parameters required to decompose spread: A brief description of the intuition underlying Eq. (A1) is as follows: Glosten and Harris (1988) indicate that for a round-trip transaction, the non-information asymmetry component is given by 2(C 0 + C 1 TradeSize) and the information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread is given by 2(Z 0 + Z 1 TradeSize), with the estimated spread being the sum of the two components.
The first component allows market makers to generate revenue from a seemingly random order flow to cover inventory holding and order processing costs, as well as provide monopoly profits.
It is a transitory component because it is unrelated to the underlying value of the securities. The second component assumes that order flows will be correlated with future price changes. It arises because rational market makers in a competitive environment will widen the spread in response to information asymmetry. Scaling of price changes by the previous price, i.e., the use of intraday return, facilitates cross-sectional comparability in the extent of information asymmetry across firms (Armstrong et al. 2009 ).
Econometrically, it can be observed from Eq. (A1), the key distinction between the information asymmetry component and the non-information asymmetry component is that the coefficients for the non-information asymmetry component is based on ΔTrade, while the information asymmetry component is based on Trade. The intuition for the difference is as follows. The non-information asymmetry component assumes that market makers generate revenue using random switching between buyer-and seller-initiated trades to "buy low and sell high" on average. ΔTrade captures the idea that when a buy (sell) order is filled, market makers raise bid and/or ask prices to increase the probability that the next order will be a sell (buy) to maintain inventory. Price changes, which reflect the compensation to the market makers, reverse on average (i.e., the effect of trades on prices is transitory). The information asymmetry component captures the idea that buy orders (i.e., Trade = 1) cause "true" prices to rise by (Z 0 + Z 1 TradeSize) while sell orders (i.e., Trade = -1) cause them to fall by -(Z 0 + Z 1 TradeSize). Buy and sell orders cause a permanent effect on prices since they are due to a change in expectations of firm value. Eq. (A1) provides the regression coefficients, Z 0 , Z 1, C 0, and C 1 . For trade size, we compute the average trade size (AvgTradeSize).
We compute IASpread and NIASpread using the intraday data from the Institute for the Prior to using the data, the intraday data is cleaned following the procedure discussed in Ng et al. (2008) . All the intraday data in each year is then used to compute annual measures of IASpread and NIASpread. et al. 2002) . PSOS is the probability of symmetric order flow shock based on Duarte and Young (2008) . #Inst (#Trans) is the number of shares held by institutional (transitory) investors. %Inst (%Trans) is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional (transitory) investors. HerfInst (HerfTrans) is the Herfindahl measure for institutional (transitory) holdings multiplied by -1 so that it is increasing in competition. Beta is the post-ranking Dimson (1979) beta calculated using 40 portfolios formed on five-year rolling pre-ranking individual firm betas.
Size is the natural log of the year end market value of equity. BTM is the book to market ratio, which is the natural log of year end market value of equity divided by the book value of equity known three months prior to the calendar year end. where the dependent variable, R t+1 , is a monthly realized return in year t+1. All independent variables are from year t. IASpread is the scaled information asymmetry component of spread calculated according to the modified Glosten and Harris (1988) methodology. NIASpread is the non-information asymmetry proportion of spread. Competition is either #Inst, %Inst, HerfInst, #Trans, %Trans, or HerfTrans. #Inst (#Trans) is the number of shares held by institutional (transitory) investors. %Inst (%Trans) is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional (transitory) investors. HerfInst (HerfTrans) is the Herfindahl measure for institutional (transitory) holdings multiplied by -1 so that it is increasing in competition. Competition measures are ranked into quintiles and scaled so that their quintile rankings range from zero to one. Beta is the post-ranking Dimson (1979) beta calculated using 40 portfolios formed on five-year rolling pre-ranking individual firm betas. Size is the natural log of the year end market value of equity. BTM is the book to market ratio, which is the natural log of year end market value of equity divided by the book value of equity known three months prior to the calendar year end. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistics are below the coefficient estimates in parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Duarte and Young's (2008) adjusted PIN measure representing the information asymmetry component of PIN. PSOS is the probability of symmetric order flow shock based on Duarte and Young (2008) . Competition is either #Inst, %Inst, HerfInst, #Trans, %Trans, or HerfTrans. #Inst (#Trans) is the number of shares held by institutional (transitory) investors. %Inst (%Trans) is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional (transitory) investors. HerfInst (HerfTrans) is the Herfindahl measure for institutional (transitory) holdings multiplied by -1 so that it is increasing in competition. Competition measures ranked into quintiles and are scaled so that their quintile rankings range from zero to one. Beta is the post-ranking Dimson (1979) beta calculated using 40 portfolios formed on five-year rolling pre-ranking individual firm betas. Size is the natural log of the year end market value of equity. BTM is the book to market ratio, which is the natural log of year end market value of equity divided by the book value of equity known three months prior to the calendar year end. The Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistics are below the coefficient estimates in parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This table presents the regressions that examine how the pricing of information asymmetry varies with competition after controlling for the broader trading environment. The regression specification is similar to that in Table 3 . We add additional controls for trading environment by including Turnover, and its interactions with proxies for information asymmetry and non-information-asymmetry. Turnover is ranked into quintiles based on the distribution within the year. The quintile ranks are then scaled to range from zero to one. Information asymmetry and noninformation-asymmetry are proxied by IASpread and NIASpread (AdjPIN and PSOS) This table presents the regressions that examine how the pricing of information quality (IQ) varies with competition. The regression specification is identical to that in Table 3 . Information quality is proxied by AQ, Smoothness, and FOG. AQ is the standard deviation calculated over a five year period of a firm's residuals from an annual estimation of the modified Dechow-Dichev (2002 ) model (Francis et al. 2005 . Smoothness is the ratio of firm's standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of cash flows from operations divided by beginning total assets. FOG is the measure of financial statement readability developed in Li (2008) . The regressions for AQ, Smoothness, and FOG use 546, 882, 546, 882 , and 220,721 firmmonths. Competition is measured as either #Trans, %Trans, or HerfTrans, with the quintile rankings scaled to range from zero to one. All other variables are defined in Table 2 . The Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistics are below the coefficient estimates in parentheses. Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
IQ = AQ

